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Momentum seemed to be escalating in early 2014 for the passage of a
comprehensive reform package of the housing finance system in the U.S., but that
was not to be, as neither political party fully supported its passage, derailing the
progress made over the previous few years.
While consensus around the primary features of reform
has grown, new research that questions these assumptions needs to be addressed and the inertia keeping the
country mired in the current, uncertain system needs to
be overcome. In this brief, we will discuss the progress
made thus far en route to reform, analyze the disparate
elements of the leading proposals, and incorporate new
findings that will shape the additional research that
must be done before policymakers can agree on the best
path forward.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)—both known as government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—are the vehicles in
the United States for creating a secondary market for
residential mortgages and for providing liquidity to
that market. They purchase conforming mortgages from
lenders—primarily single-family, 30-year fixed rate
mortgages that have not been insured by the federal

SUMMARY
• The U.S. government’s open-ended assistance in the housing
industry is not a feasible long-term strategy for economic growth,
and ending the current conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac is fundamental to any housing finance reform measure.
• Several points of consensus for reform have emerged, including:
preserving the 30-year fixed rate mortgage and the market for
mortgage-backed securities (MBS); ordering private capital in a
first-loss position with a government guarantee to protect only
against catastrophic outcomes; creating a common securitization
platform (CSP) to provide transparency and liquidity; and providing
for affordable housing directives.
• New research from the Federal Reserve, which proposes that
a catastrophic risk insurance premium be added on top of the
other new costs of reform, also demands consideration.
• This brief breaks down several leading reform proposals and
contains an in-depth analysis of the Johnson-Crapo Housing
Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 and its
possible effects on mortgage rates.
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POINTS OF CONSENSUS FOR
SECURITIZATION REFORM IN
EARLY 2015

government—in order to allow lenders to make more loans to borrowers.
They then maintain these purchased
loans in their own portfolios or, more
often than not, package them into
mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
which they sell to investors. The fees
charged to investors for guaranteeing payment on the MBS are a major
source of income for Fannie and
Freddie.1 Prior to 2008, both GSEs
were private companies that had these
same responsibilities, although Congress created them at different times.
But as a consequence of the financial crisis, Fannie and Freddie were
placed under the conservatorship of
the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) on September 7, 2008.
Under the regulation of the FHFA,
they collectively received $180 billion
in assistance, which they subsequently
repaid in full, and they have gone on
to earn profits in recent years. Despite
these facts, they remain in conservatorship and the system of insuring
mortgages in the U.S. continues to
rely on the open-ended assistance of
the federal government.

antee fees (g-fees) could provide this
catastrophic government guarantee.
Up front private capital could shield
taxpayers from having to pay for bailouts in the event of another financial
crisis, but disagreements abound as to
the level and the make-up of private
capital necessary in this first-loss position. We will analyze the consequences
of differing estimates below.
Third, a common securitization
platform (CSP) is the best way of
ensuring transparency and liquidity
and maintaining oversight of credit
standards in the MBS market. There
is continuing debate as to whether
there should be one security or more,
especially given the likely continuance of the GNMA security which
insures the timely payment of pools of
100% government-guaranteed FHA/
VA mortgages. In any case, this utility
would set loan origination, servicing,
pooling, and securitization standards.
Last, affordable housing should, in
some way, be addressed in any reform.
An important choice is whether
affordable housing will become the
primary responsibility of the FHA, or
whether affordable housing mandates
should also be imposed on any system
designed to replace Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.3 Failing to add affordable housing directives will exacerbate

After much economic and legislative
debate in Congress, a number of key
requirements have emerged that likely
will be present in any reform proposal
which moves the country away from
the current system. The first requirement is the acknowledgment that the
30-year fixed rate mortgage is still
the principal mortgage product in
the United States. Historically, most
banks have swapped the mortgages
they originated for GSE mortgagebacked securities into the secondary
market to decrease their risk exposure.
The preservation of the TBA (ToBe-Announced) Market for MBS is
necessary to support the liquidity of
this market and to help ensure the
continued existence of the 30-year
fixed rate mortgage.2
The second requirement appearing as a point of consensus is that
private capital should be located in a
first-loss position to absorb downturns
in the MBS market, with the government providing a guarantee behind
that first-loss position to insure only
against catastrophic outcomes. A Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC)-like fund supported by guar-

NOTES
Currently, guarantee fees roughly equal portfolio income in
Fannie Mae’s single family market and account for about
80% of portfolio income in its multifamily market. Guarantee fees are an even larger income source for Freddie Mac.
See: http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/
quarterly-annual-results/2014/10k_2014.pdf and http://
www.freddiemac.com/investors/er/pdf/10k_021915.pdf.
2 For a further discussion on the TBA Market, see Akash
Kanojia and Meghan Grant. “Preserving the TBA Market.”
Forthcoming.
1

For a further discussion on FHA, see Kevin A. Park and Roberto G. Quercia’s “The Once and Future Federal Housing
Administration.” Forthcoming.
4 Diana Hancock, and Wayne Passmore. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, “Macroprudential Mortgage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” Forthcoming.
5 Delaney, Carney, and Himes Introduce Housing Finance
Reform Legislation. http://delaney.house.gov/news/pressreleases/delaney-carney-and-himes-introduce-housingfinance-reform-legislation
3

2

Patricia C. Mosser, Joseph Tracy, and Joshua Wright.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Capital and
Governance of a Mortgage Securitization Utility.” January
2015.
7 Mark Zandi and Christian deRitis. Moody’s Analytics,
“Housing Finance Reform Steps Forward.” April 2014.
8 Fannie Mae, “Summary of Issues, Johnson-Crapo Discussion.” April 2014.
9 Freddie Mac, “Analysis of Johnson-Crapo Discussion.”
March 2014.
6
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risk-based pricing and lead to less
cross-subsidization which, in turn,
may make loans prohibitively expensive to people in underserved communities and may lead to procyclicality
in these markets and in the overall
housing finance market, as discussed
below.
This is the current state of the
dialogue surrounding reform, but
new findings from researchers at
the Federal Reserve indicate that
these requirements alone may not be
enough to stave off future bailouts
of failing financial institutions. They
suggest that all mortgages, whether
securitized privately or through a
GSE-like program, should be insured
against catastrophic risk.4

EXISTING PROPOSALS
The aforementioned points of consensus that developed over the last several
years stem from various proposals
offered in Congress. The option we
will consider in depth is the JohnsonCrapo Housing Finance Reform and
Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, and
we will compare this to two other
options: a cooperative, as suggested by
NY Federal Reserve Bank researchers,
and a reformed, privatized Fannie and
Freddie system, as suggested by vari-

ous groups of existing shareholders of
the remaining outstanding common
and preferred stock of those companies. We also will consider the implications of the recent Federal Reserve
research on catastrophic risk insurance
in the housing finance system.
It does warrant mentioning, however, that other significant proposals exist. The first is the Protecting
American Taxpayers and Homeowners (PATH) Act, which the House
Committee on Financial Services
approved in 2013 and calls for phasing out the GSEs, marginalizing the
role of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and establishing a
non-profit National Mortgage Market
Utility. This Utility would not be able
to guarantee mortgages, but would
set loan origination, servicing, pooling, and securitization standards. The
second proposal is the Partnership
to Strengthen Homeownership Act,
introduced in the House in July 2014
by Representatives John K. Delaney
(D-MD), John Carney (D-DE), and
Jim Himes (D-CT). This bill would
replace the GSEs with an insurance
program established through Ginnie
Mae. It calls for a 5% private capital shield in a first-loss position and
stipulates that the remaining 95%
of the risk be shared between Gin-

nie Mae and a private reinsurer on a
pari passu basis.5 In this proposal, the
government guarantee is fully priced
in the market and there is no effective backstop. Even though in theory
this model should provide market
discipline, mortgage guarantors can
go out of business. It therefore raises
the question of whether lending will
remain robust in times of market
stress.6

THE JOHNSON-CRAPO
OPTION
Bipartisan legislation introduced by
Senators Tim Johnson (D-SD) and
Mike Crapo (R-ID) built upon previous legislation offered by Senators
Bob Corker (R-TN) and Mark Warner (D-VA) and attempted to coalesce
each reform requirement under a
single bill. Johnson-Crapo creates
the FDIC-like Federal Mortgage
Insurance Corporation (FMIC) that
would serve as the regulator responsible for oversight of the mortgage
insuring, securitizing, and servicing
processes. The FMIC would provide
an explicit government backstop for
eligible MBS, thus codifying the
implicit guarantee historically provided by Fannie and Freddie, both of
which would be phased out under this

NOTES
Akash Kanojia and Meghan Grant. “Preserving the TBA
Market.” Forthcoming.
11 For a further discussion on the difficulties of correctly
pricing risk for mortgage securities, see Levitin, Adam J.,
and Susan M. Wachter. “Explaining the Housing Bubble.”
Georgetown Law Journal 100.4 (2012): 1177-1258.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669401
12 For a further discussion on how the lack of availability in
the mortgage market causes economic and regulatory
problems, see Levitin, Adam J., and Susan M. Wachter.
10

“Second-Liens and the Leverage Option.” U of Penn, Inst
for Law & Econ Research Paper Forthcoming (2015).
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2556687
13 Mark Zandi and Christian deRitis. Moody’s Analytics,
“Housing Finance Reform Steps Forward.” April 2014.
14 Fannie Mae, “Summary of Issues, Johnson-Crapo Discussion.” April 2014.
15 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: S. 1217
Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of
2014.” May 2014. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/

3

s1217_0.pdf
Laurie Goodman, Jim Parrott, and Ellen Seidman. Urban
Institute, “A Johnson-Crapo Dialogue.” July 2014.
17 Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, “Macroprudential Mortgage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” Forthcoming.
18 Patricia C. Mosser, Joseph Tracy, and Joshua Wright. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “The Capital and Governance of a Mortgage Securitization Utility.” January 2015.
19 Clifford V. Rossi. Chesapeake Risk Advisors, LLC, “Forging
16
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legislation and replaced by similarly
funded aggregators. It would further create and regulate a new CSP
focused on preserving the 30-year
fixed rate mortgage.7
The Johnson-Crapo bill mandates a 10% private capital shield
in a first-loss position in order for
financial institutions to qualify for the
government guarantee, but predictions of the bill’s overall effects on
mortgage rates vary widely depending
on who is doing the estimating. The
FHFA required Fannie and Freddie
to provide estimates on how JohnsonCrapo would affect mortgage rates,
which we analyze in Table 1.8, 9 We
also consider estimates put forth by
Mark Zandi and Christian deRitis
of Moody’s Analytics. Each of the
three organizations presents different
scenarios, which we group together by
how they allocate the cost of guarantors’ capital. How policymakers decide
which forms of capital will make
up the 10% buffer remains an open
question, but the categories in Table 1
(Rigid vs. Flexible Capital Structures)
illustrate that defining these features
of the bill can lead to large disparities
in the cost of capital and, ultimately,
in mortgage rates. Comparing the
three estimates of the Rigid Capital
Structure is difficult because each

TABLE 1:

ASSUMED MORTGAGE RATES UNDER JOHNSON-CRAPO

April 2014 (no. in basis points)

Rigid Capital Structure

a

Moody’s

b

Fannie Mae

g

Freddie Mac

Guarantee fee		
128		146		205
Cost of capital (10% private in first-loss position)		

86		

116		

160

Common equity

4%

76

5%

77

7%

148

Preferred equity

0%

0

5%

39

7%

0

Debt or risk syndication

6%

18

0%

0

3%

12

Present value of future guarantee fees

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

Less: Return on cash reserves to pay for losses		

-8		

–		

–

Administrative costs		

10		

10		

9

Expected losses		
10		5		8
Mortgage Insurance Fund		

10		

5		

15

Market Access Fund		
10		10		13
Yield on Mortgage Securities

335		330		335

Servicing and Origination Compensation

50		50		50

Assumed Mortgage Rate

511		526		590

Flexible Capital Structure

d

Guarantee fee

Moody’s

e

Fannie Mae

z

Freddie Mac

109		 100		

Cost of capital (10% private in first-loss position)		

83

69		

70		

62

Common equity

3%

57

3%

46

4%

50

Preferred equity

1%

11

3%

23

1%

6

Debt or risk syndication

3%

9

0%

0

4%

6

Present value of future guarantee fees

3%

0

4%

0

1%

0

Less: Return on cash reserves to pay for losses		

-8		

–		

–

Administrative costs		

10		

10		

6

Expected losses		
10		5		3
Mortgage Insurance Fund		

10		

5		

5

Market Access Fund		

10		

10		

7

Yield on Mortgage Securities

335		350		325

Servicing and Origination Compensation

50		50		50

Assumed Mortgage Rate
a = Moody’s “Strict Interpretation”
b = Fannie Mae’s “Model Fee with Preferred Equity”
g = Freddie Mac’s “High Cost Scenario”

494		480		458
d = Moody’s “Liberal Interpretation”
e = Fannie Mae’s “Model Fee with Future Fees + Preferred Equity”
z = Freddie Mac’s “Low Cost Scenario”

NOTES
a Path out of Conservatorship for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.” October 2014.
20 This path would also include the use of credit risk transfer
securities, such as Fannie Mae’s Connecticut Avenue
Securities and Freddie Mac’s STACR debt. For more information, see Treasury official Michael Stegman’s remarks.
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl9987.aspx
21 For a further discussion on credit in the housing market,
see Wachter, Susan M., “Credit Supply and Housing Prices

in National and Local Markets.” (2014). http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2508029
22 Laurie Goodman, Jim Parrott, and Ellen Seidman. Urban
Institute, “A Johnson-Crapo Dialogue.” July 2014.
23 Another difference between the reform options so far
discussed is that there would be less vertical integration
in the revamped Fannie and Freddie system as they would
continue not originating loans. A potential shortcoming
that poses a “Too Big to Fail” risk under Johnson-Crapo
is that the bill allows for financial institutions to be both

4

guarantors and originators, though momentum has pushed
policymakers away from this idea. See: Mark Zandi, and
Christian deRitis. Moody’s Analytics, “Housing Finance
Reform Steps Forward.” April 2014.
24 Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, “Macroprudential Mortgage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” Forthcoming.
25 For a further discussion, see Wachter, Susan. “The Market
Structure of Securitization and the US housing bubble.”
National Institute Economic Review 230.1 (2014): R34-
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organization presents very different
capital breakdowns. What they have
in common, however, is that each
allows the use of only two distinct
forms of capital (i.e., specific equity
and debt instruments) and none allow
for the inclusion of the present value
of future g-fees to count towards the
10% threshold. The Flexible Capital
Structure does allow for the inclusion
of future g-fees and has no restrictions
on how the 10% is composed.
Another open question is the 10%
level itself. Both Moody’s and the
Urban Institute’s analyses find that
a 4-5% private capital buffer would
have been sufficient for Fannie and
Freddie to withstand the crisis begun
in 2007 (note: the actual level the
GSEs maintained both at that time
and now is closer to 1%). They each
question the need for such a high
level of private capital in a first-loss
position because they assume a high
quality book of business with underlying mortgages meeting basic qualified
mortgage standards, which is already
a requirement under Johnson-Crapo.
Furthermore, the GSEs and Ginnie
Mae currently impose strict guidelines
on which mortgages are eligible for
securitization.10 Recent analysis from
Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore of the Federal Reserve suggests

that private capitalization of more
than 15% may be required to avoid a
future government intervention, but
the depth of the need for capital and
the cyclicality depends in the end on
underwriting over the cycle, and the
sheer lack of availability of information about potential mortgage losses
accounts for the uncertainty surrounding these estimates.11, 12
Other factors that lead to conflicting estimates of mortgage rates
under Johnson-Crapo are different return assumptions and varying
estimations of the cost of the Market
Access Fund. The Market Access
Fund noted in Table 1 is shorthand,
referring to both a newly created
fund of the same name that would be
charged with overseeing the creation
of responsible lending products for
underserved communities, as well as a
new Housing Trust Fund that would
be required to ensure the availability
of quality housing.13 These funds are
merely incentives to provide access for
housing and are a departure from the
current system whereby the two GSEs
have specific affordable housing goals.

IMPLICATIONS OF
MORTGAGE RATE ESTIMATES
According to Fannie Mae, whose

NOTES
26

R44. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508030
Clifford V. Rossi. Chesapeake Risk Advisors, LLC, “Forging
a Path out of Conservatorship for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.” October 2014.

5

guarantee fee was 47 basis points
(bp) in April 2014 (i.e., the same
timeframe as Table 1), the average
mortgage rate was 447bp.14 Therefore, under Johnson-Crapo, mortgage
rates could rise by anywhere from
64 to 143bp, or 14-32%, under the
Rigid Capital Structure. Moody’s
simulated a 50bp increase in fixed
mortgage rates and, after three years
(beginning retroactively in January
2014), it determined that the homeownership rate would be about 0.1%
lower, with annual home sales lower
by approximately 250,000 units and
housing starts down by over 100,000
units. Further analysis appears warranted, given a potential rise in fixed
mortgage rates of about three times
the size simulated by Moody’s. What
effect would this have on homebuyers, especially first-time buyers, and
on the economy as a whole, if higher
rates lead to fewer sales and decreased
homeownership?
Another unknown is the effect
Johnson-Crapo would have on the
federal budget. Static projections
from the CBO estimate that enacting
Johnson-Crapo would decrease federal
deficits by $58 billion over the 20152024 decade.15 The CBO predicts a
$60 billion drop in direct spending,
as new FMIC fees would exceed the
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cost of guarantees, and revenue would
drop slightly since the FHFA would
no longer assess GSE fees. But there
is also an equity component that the
CBO fails to account for. A move
away from the current system likely
would decrease the federal government’s equity ownership in and
income from the GSEs. Additionally,
such a shift in the housing finance
landscape could alter the behavior of
mortgage issuers in less straightforward ways. Therefore, budget-scoring
Johnson-Crapo, taking into account
additional estimates, and discovering
the second order effects of reform that
might make moving away from the
status quo more (or less) economically attractive could provide helpful
insight.16
Furthermore, how stable is
Johnson-Crapo over the business
cycle? This procyclicality question is
key for the overall advisability of the
legislation, of course, as well as for
an evaluation of how estimates of the
cost of capital change over time.17
Policymakers have yet to seek answers
to these questions.

THE COOPERATIVE
ALTERNATIVE
Patricia Mosser, Joseph Tracy and
Joshua Wright, researchers at the
NY Federal Reserve Bank, separately
offer the proposal of a lender-owned
cooperative that both securitizes and
guarantees standardized mortgage
products through a mutualized securitization utility. Since the utility would
have an in-house insurance function,
the cooperative would be incented to
maintain credit standards and decrease
excessive risk taking.18 It is argued

that a mutualized ownership structure
could prevent deterioration in underwriting, rather than relying solely on
regulation to accomplish this end. To
support robustness and availability of
securitization through the cycle, the
utility is required to purchase government reinsurance against systemic
credit events for whole vintages of
mortgage securities. The vintagebased capital structure could mitigate
the procyclicality of mortgage credit,
thus reducing the private capital
requirement far below the 15% level
presented by Hancock and Passmore
and even below the 10% level stated
in Johnson-Crapo. In contrast to
institution-level reinsurance, vintagelevel reinsurance would help maintain
investors’ and issuers’ incentives to
continue participating in the utility,
thereby facilitating business continuity through a crisis and subsequent
recovery.

REFORMING FANNIE AND
FREDDIE
A phase-out of the GSEs will be
costly, take a long time (potentially
more than the five years stated in
Johnson-Crapo given the size of the
enterprises and the complexities of
their operations), and leave room for
hiccups in the MBS market during
the transition. Reforming Fannie
and Freddie by obtaining sufficient
up front private capital to bolster
the infrastructure already in place is
another alternative to Johnson-Crapo,
especially considering the inertia of
the current system. The GSEs’ infrastructure will be needed regardless in
order to create the CSP, which the
FHFA is already beginning to develop
6

under the joint ownership of Fannie
and Freddie. With recapitalized GSEs
with far larger capital requirements,
sufficient to protect the government
against all but catastrophic losses,
the argument is that there is no need
to manage risk by explicitly pricing
the premium provided by the GSEs’
implicit government guarantee. But
a true reform of the current system
means that the GSEs would have to
be permitted to exit conservatorship
after demonstrating that they can
meet minimum regulatory capital
requirements—a daunting task that
could take up to five years itself.19
Additionally, they would have to wind
down their retained portfolios, the
government guarantee would have
to be addressed, and the question
of “who owns the system?” must be
answered.
In the absence of phasing out or
reprivatizing Fannie and Freddie,
there remains the option to continue
along the current path of developing a CSP and a common security,
which the government would stand
behind.20, 21 Not only does this raise
the question of whether or not to
merge Fannie’s and Freddie’s operations, but also whether the U.S. should
de facto nationalize the housing
finance system.
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
THE COST OF CREDIT

This political question about the
government’s role in the housing
market will inform the direction
of legislation, but the answer to
this question hinges upon a further
question: what is the goal of
housing finance reform generally?
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Cross-subsidization of loans has
been a GSE practice, but JohnsonCrapo’s flexible incentive fee is its
only form of cross subsidy. Absent
other mandates, private capital in
a first-loss position—one of the
widely acknowledged requirements
of reform—will lead to risk-based
pricing, which will have implications
for the procyclicality of the
housing finance system as well as
the sustainability of an affordable
housing mandate.22, 23
There also remains the question of
how much private capital in a firstloss position is really needed, which
we return to now.

THE CATASTROPHIC RISK
INSURANCE CONDITION
New research from the Federal
Reserve suggests, as other researchers have previously hypothesized, that
the combination of the private sector
first-loss capital requirement and

expectations of government bailouts in
the event of a catastrophe would make
government-sponsored securitization
less competitive than private securitization during economic upswings.
The options above are subject to this
crowding out in an expansion phase
of the cycle. A surprising new finding
from a simulation analysis posits that,
despite these generally agreed upon
requirements of reform, all mortgages
regardless of securitization (private
vs. government) may need to be
insured against catastrophic risk—an
additional TRIA-like requirement.
The researchers suggest that a mortgage insurance premium should be
added on top of the other new costs
of reform (namely, the capital costs
associated with the private sector firstloss position and the increased g-fees
designed to cover catastrophic default
losses) because these costs are potentially insufficient and leave taxpayers
exposed during a catastrophic economic event.24, 25

7

OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER
ANALYSIS
Housing markets, investors, and borrowers have joined the GSEs in limbo
over the last six years.26 Ending the
conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie
is fundamental to any housing finance
reform measure. Political issues aside,
there are still unknowns that should
be explored which would help shed
light on whether a Johnson-Crapolike path would be more or less advisable than an overhauling of the GSEs.
As discussed above, one unknown is
the stability of Johnson-Crapo over
the business cycle. Another unknown
entails budget-scoring JohnsonCrapo. But while these recommendations for further analysis are useful,
nothing can take the place of political
will. The United States government’s
open-ended assistance in the housing
industry is not a feasible long-term
strategy.
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